Optimizely has confirmed a security incident in its Web Experimentation product. In a status notice posted at 01:02 UTC on November 17, 2026, the company said an outsider abused a vulnerability in Experimentation to add harmful JavaScript to a number of customer projects. It says the hole is now closed and the planted code has been taken out.
The attack ran through November 16 and was first documented by Scott Helme of Report URI. His team found 188 infected Optimizely script files belonging to 178 organisations, among them Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab and IKEA. For web developers it is a clear case of a trusted third-party script turning hostile without any change on the site itself.
What Optimizely has said
The vendor's notice is short. It states that the vulnerable code path has been fixed and that the injected scripts were deleted from every project that was hit. Optimizely adds that it secured the user accounts involved and switched on extra safeguards meant to stop unapproved code from being delivered.
The incident is in the monitoring stage on the company's status page. The notice does not name the vulnerability, say how many customers were touched or explain what the account-related steps were. Report URI wrote that it had tried several channels to reach Optimizely and had received no reply when its analysis went out.
How the injection worked
Optimizely Web customers load a per-project script, usually from the company's CDN. Besides Optimizely's own code and the customer's experiments, that file can carry an optional block of custom code called Project JavaScript, which the customer writes in the dashboard and which runs on every page.
According to Report URI, the attacker wrote a small loader into that block and left everything else alone. The file still came from the usual Optimizely host with a valid certificate, so browsers and site owners had no reason to distrust it. The researchers stress that this was not cache poisoning: the CDN simply served what the project contained.
Three forms of the loader were seen:
- A plain script element that fetched a file named track.js from an attacker domain, used in most cases.
- The same address hidden with base64 encoding, so a text search for the domain would miss it.
- A full copy of the payload placed inline and executed through eval when the remote domain was blocked.
Sites that serve the Optimizely file from their own domain were hit as well, since both paths deliver one and the same project file. Optimizely's own website and login page carried the code too.
What the malicious script did
Report URI's analysis, which BleepingComputer confirmed separately from copies of the altered files, describes a kit with several functions active at once:
- Wallet swapping: cryptocurrency addresses in page text, forms, the clipboard and outgoing requests were replaced with the attacker's.
- Card skimming: introduced at 13:43 UTC, this part watched form posts for card number, expiry and security code. Fields inside hosted payment frames such as Stripe or Adyen were out of reach.
- Cookie and screenshot theft: the page address, any cookies readable by script and an image of the page were sent out.
- iOS exploit delivery: iPhones and iPads were routed to two known exploit kits, Coruna and DarkSword, picked by iOS version.
The researchers traced roughly $7,040 in stolen cryptocurrency to the attacker's wallets by the evening of November 16. They could not tell how many cards or cookies were collected.
Timeline and scale
The first injection was seen at 04:21 UTC on November 16 in the BBC's file. The attacker rebuilt the payload 26 times that day, adding features as it went. One customer's file was cleaned and then infected again, which shows the access was still live at that point.
Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely files it could locate and found 188 infected. A mass clean-up followed between about 20:40 and 21:10 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only one file still held the code. The team believes the true count is higher, since it could only test files it found in time.
Why Content Security Policy mattered
The same report looked at the Content Security Policy of affected sites. Of the organisations it could assess, 68 had no policy, 50 had one that permitted the script to load and to send stolen data out, and 17 stopped the outgoing data but not the address swapping. Only 24, about 15%, blocked the payload.
Allowing the Optimizely host was never the deciding factor, because the bad code arrived from that host. The protected sites had a tight script-src list that did not include the attacker's domain. Two common settings weakened it: strict-dynamic, which extends trust to anything a trusted script inserts, and unsafe-eval, which let the inline fallback run.
What it means for developers
Teams running Optimizely Web should not rely on the vendor clean-up alone. Report URI advises opening the Project JavaScript of every project and the custom code of every experiment, and looking for unknown script loads or base64 decoding calls. Review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to the account, then rotate credentials.
Treat data from November 16 as exposed where it applies. That covers cards typed into your own form fields and any session tokens kept in cookies without the HttpOnly flag. Visitors on older iOS builds should update: the kit's own notes list iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 or later as patched.
The wider lesson is about every tag manager, analytics script and testing tool you load. A restrictive script-src and connect-src, CSP reporting and HttpOnly cookies limit what a hijacked vendor script can do. Our guide to web application security practices covers these basics, and last week's wfx-loot campaign showed the same trust problem inside CI pipelines.
Conclusion
Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed and the injected code is gone, but it has not yet explained the flaw or the full customer impact. Until it does, teams using Optimizely Web should audit their project code, rotate account credentials and tighten their Content Security Policy so that the next compromised third-party script has far less room to work.
Sources
- Optimizely Status: Web Experimentation Security Incident
- Report URI: World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely
- BleepingComputer: Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware
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