Amazon Web Services announced on November 16, 2026 that AWS Backup logically air-gapped vaults can now hold backups of Amazon RDS DB instances. Until now, RDS teams that wanted isolated, tamper-proof copies of their databases had to build that protection themselves, usually with cross-account copies and an optional vault lock.
The change matters because ransomware and stolen credentials often go after backups first. An air-gapped vault keeps RDS snapshots in an account owned by the AWS Backup service, locks them so nobody can shorten their retention, and lets a separate recovery account restore from them directly.
What AWS Announced
This vault type is a special AWS Backup container designed for recovery after a cyber attack. Its recovery points are immutable and isolated from the account that produced them. Vault Lock in compliance mode is switched on by default, so a backup cannot be edited or removed before its retention period runs out, even by an administrator.
With this launch, RDS DB instances join the list of resources that can be protected this way. The main points are:
- RDS snapshots can go into the isolated vault directly as the main target, or arrive there later through a copy rule in a backup plan.
- Encryption uses either a key owned by AWS or one that you manage yourself in KMS.
- The vault can be shared with other accounts through AWS Resource Access Manager (RAM) for recovery or restore testing.
- Multi-party approval gives a second, independent way to reach the vault if the owning account is compromised.
- Shared accounts can start restore jobs directly from the vault, without first copying the snapshot.
Setup works from the AWS Backup console, the AWS CLI or the AWS SDKs. AWS says the feature is offered in most Regions where both RDS and logically air-gapped vaults already run.
How the Backup Flow Works for RDS
RDS is not fully managed by AWS Backup, so the service uses its own workflow for these vaults. When the isolated vault is picked as the primary target, the service starts by writing a short-lived snapshot to a regular vault. It then copies that snapshot to the air-gapped vault and removes the temporary one automatically once the copy succeeds.
If that copy fails, the temporary recovery point is kept in the standard vault for the retention you set. You still have a usable backup in that case, but it is not isolated. Teams should watch backup job messages so that a silent fallback does not go unnoticed for weeks.
For now, the destination vault has to live in the account and Region that also host the source DB instance. Cross-Region copies to or from these vaults are not yet available for RDS backups, according to the AWS Backup developer guide.
Limits Database Teams Should Know
The biggest catch is encryption. RDS backups keep the key of the source database, and instances encrypted with the default AWS managed key (aws/rds) cannot be copied into an air-gapped vault. Only databases protected by a customer managed key, or with no encryption at all, qualify.
If such an instance sits in a plan aimed at the isolated vault, the job still reports success, yet the backup stays in the standard vault with an explanatory message. The KMS key of a running instance cannot be swapped in place.
To fix that for good, AWS suggests copying a snapshot with a new key and restoring from it, or switching keys through a blue/green deployment.
Point-in-time recovery is the second limit. Continuous backups stay in the standard vault, since a copied continuous backup turns into a plain snapshot. Only snapshots reach the air-gapped vault, so its recovery point objective depends on how often you take them.
What It Means for Developers and DBAs
For teams running Oracle, PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB or SQL Server on RDS, this closes a real gap in ransomware planning. Earlier, a cross-account copy into a dedicated backup account was the common pattern, but it relied on keys shared across accounts and an optional lock that someone had to remember to set.
Recovery time can also improve for large databases. With a cross-account copy, a big snapshot had to be copied into the recovery account before a restore could begin. A shared air-gapped vault removes that step, so restores start right away.
A sensible layout, based on the AWS guidance, uses up to three copies:
- A standard vault in the workload account for fast operational restores with PITR.
- An air-gapped vault in the same Region as the main defense against ransomware and account takeover.
- A cross-Region copy in a standard vault for protection against a Regional outage.
Not every database needs all three. A small reporting database with a daily snapshot target might rely on the air-gapped vault alone, while a regulated core system will likely want all of them. Readers who also run Azure SQL can compare this with Microsoft's recent PITR backup immutability lock preview.
Costs and Testing
Storage in an air-gapped vault is billed at a higher rate than storage in a standard vault. With the primary-target approach you pay briefly for the temporary snapshot plus the vault copy, but keep only one long-term copy. A copy action instead keeps full copies in both vaults for their entire retention.
AWS also recommends sharing the vault with a separate forensic account and running scheduled restore tests against it. An EventBridge rule can fire a Lambda function after each restore to check row counts or run sample queries, then report the outcome back to the restore job.
How to Get Started
First, check which RDS instances still use the aws/rds key, because those are the ones that will quietly miss the vault. Next, set up an isolated vault in that same Region, add it to a backup plan as the primary target or as a copy destination, and assign the DB instances.
Finally, share the vault through RAM with a recovery account and plan a multi-party approval team that lives outside your main AWS Organization. Teams already tuning RDS maintenance may also find our note on shorter RDS for Oracle upgrade downtime useful.
Conclusion
Air-gapped vault support gives RDS users locked, isolated backups that live outside their own accounts and can be restored straight from a shared vault. The encryption rule around aws/rds and the lack of PITR inside the vault mean it works best alongside a standard vault, not as a full replacement.
Sources
- AWS What's New: AWS Backup adds logically air-gapped vault support for Amazon RDS
- AWS Storage Blog: Introducing AWS Backup logically air-gapped vault support for Amazon RDS
- AWS Backup Developer Guide: Logically air-gapped vault
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